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<datestamp>2018-01-14</datestamp>
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<title lang=en>Scoring Rules and Preference Restrictions: The Strong Borda Paradox Revisited</title>
<creator>Kamwa, Eric</creator>
<creator>Valognes, Fabrice</creator>
<contributor>Centre de Recherche sur les Pouvoirs Locaux dans la Caraibe (CRPLC) ; Université des Antilles et de la Guyane (UAG) - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)</contributor>
<contributor>Centre de recherche en économie et management (CREM) ; Université de Caen Normandie (UNICAEN) ; Normandie Université (NU) - Normandie Université (NU) - Université de Rennes 1 (UR1) - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)</contributor>
<description>International audience</description>
<source>ISSN: 0373-2630</source>
<source>EISSN: 2105-2883</source>
<source>Revue d Economie Politique</source>
<publisher>Editions Dalloz</publisher>
<identifier>hal-01631180</identifier>
<identifier>https://hal.univ-antilles.fr/hal-01631180</identifier>
<source>https://hal.univ-antilles.fr/hal-01631180</source>
<source>Revue d Economie Politique, Editions Dalloz, 2017, 127 (3), pp.375-395. 〈10.3917/redp.273.0375〉</source>
<identifier>DOI : 10.3917/redp.273.0375</identifier>
<relation>info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.3917/redp.273.0375</relation>
<language>en</language>
<subject lang=en>scoring rules</subject>
<subject lang=en> Condorcet</subject>
<subject lang=en> preference restrictions</subject>
<subject lang=en> strong Borda paradox</subject>
<subject lang=en> impartial anonymous culture </subject>
<subject>JEL : D.D7</subject>
<subject>[SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economies and finances</subject>
<type>info:eu-repo/semantics/article</type>
<type>Journal articles</type>
<description lang=en>For a given voting situation, the Strong Borda Paradox occurs when a Condorcet loser exists and is elected. A Condorcet loser is a candidate that loses all his pairwise comparisons. In three-candidate elections, we use an analytical approach to find out, the range of all the scoring rules that can exhibit the Strong Borda Paradox under some well-known preference restrictions and we describe all the scenarios with respect to the rank of the Condorcet loser in the collective rankings. Using the parameterized Barvinok’s algorithm, we provide a simplified representation of the likelihood of the Strong Borda Paradox for the Plurality rule and the Antiplurality rule (given the size of the electorate) with the impartial and anonymous culture condition for each type of restriction.</description>
<date>2017</date>
</dc>
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