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<title lang=en>Independent directors: less informed, but better selected? New evidence from a two-way director-firm fixed effect model</title>
<creator>Cavaco, Sandra</creator>
<creator>Crifo, Patricia</creator>
<creator>Reberioux, Antoine</creator>
<creator>Roudaut, Gwenael</creator>
<contributor>Laboratoire d'économie mathématique et de microéconomie appliquée (LEMMA) ; Université Panthéon-Assas (UP2) ; Ministère de l'Éducation nationale, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche (M.E.N.E.S.R.) - Ministère de l'Éducation nationale, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche (M.E.N.E.S.R.) - Sorbonne Universités</contributor>
<contributor>Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique ; Polytechnique - X - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)</contributor>
<contributor>Université Paris Nanterre (UPN)</contributor>
<contributor>Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations (CIRANO) ; Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM)</contributor>
<contributor>EconomiX ; Université Paris Nanterre (UPN) - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)</contributor>
<contributor>Centre de Recherche en Economie Droit et Développement Insulaire –Laboratoire d’Economie Appliquée au Développement (CREDDI/LEAD) ; Université des Antilles et de la Guyane (UAG)</contributor>
<contributor>AgroParisTech</contributor>
<identifier>hal-01060211</identifier>
<identifier>https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01060211</identifier>
<identifier>https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01060211v2/document</identifier>
<identifier>https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01060211/file/cahier%202014-29.pdf</identifier>
<source>https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01060211</source>
<source>cahier de recherche 2014-29. 2014</source>
<language>en</language>
<subject lang=en>two-way fixed effect model</subject>
<subject lang=en>firm performance</subject>
<subject lang=en>director selection</subject>
<subject lang=en>information asymmetry</subject>
<subject lang=en>independent director heterogeneity</subject>
<subject>[SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economies and finances</subject>
<subject>[SHS.GESTION] Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administration</subject>
<type>info:eu-repo/semantics/preprint</type>
<type>Preprints, Working Papers, ...</type>
<description lang=en>This paper develops a two-way director-firm fixed effect model to study the relationship between independent directors’ individual heterogeneity and firm operating performance, using French data. This strategy allows considering and differentiating in a unified empirical framework mechanisms related to board functioning and mechanisms related to director selection. We first show that the independence status, netted out unobservable individual heterogeneity, is negatively related to performance. This result suggests that independent board members experience a strong informational gap that outweighs other monitoring benefits. However, we show that industry-specific expertise as well as informal connections inside the boardroom may help to bridge this gap. Second, we provide evidence that independent directors have higher intrinsic ability as compared to affiliated board members, consistent with a reputation-based selection process.</description>
<date>2014-11-24</date>
</dc>
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