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<datestamp>2018-01-11</datestamp>
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<title lang=en>Are pollution permit markets harmful for employment?</title>
<creator>Sanz, Nicolas</creator>
<creator>Schwartz, Sonia</creator>
<contributor>Centre de Recherche en Economie, Gestion, Modélisation et Informatique Appliquée (CEREGMIA) ; Université des Antilles et de la Guyane (UAG)</contributor>
<contributor>Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International (CERDI) ; Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I (UdA) - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)</contributor>
<source>ISSN: 0264-9993</source>
<source>Economic Modelling</source>
<publisher>Elsevier</publisher>
<identifier>halshs-00866721</identifier>
<identifier>https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00866721</identifier>
<source>https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00866721</source>
<source>Economic Modelling, Elsevier, 2013, 35, pp.374-383</source>
<language>fr</language>
<subject lang=fr>Monopolistic competition</subject>
<subject lang=fr>Equilibrium employment</subject>
<subject lang=fr>Pollution permit market</subject>
<subject lang=fr>Unemployment benefits</subject>
<subject>JEL : E.E2.E24</subject>
<subject>JEL : J.J5.J50</subject>
<subject>JEL : L.L1.L13</subject>
<subject>JEL : Q.Q5.Q52</subject>
<subject>JEL : Q.Q5.Q58</subject>
<subject>[SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economies and finances</subject>
<type>info:eu-repo/semantics/article</type>
<type>Journal articles</type>
<description lang=en>This paper analyzes the effects of pollution permit markets on equilibrium employment in a wage-setting/ price-setting (WS-PS) model. The employment level is determined according to different methods of financing unemployment benefits: a wage tax or the revenue from a pollution permit auction. We show that a permit market weakens the trade unions' market power. Furthermore, whatever the method of financing unemployment benefits, the choice of the pollution cap is always neutral for employment, and the level of employment always increases as the pollution abatement technology becomes more efficient. Depending on the value of the wage tax, the employment level can be higher or lower when unemployment benefits are financed by pollution permits rather than wage tax.</description>
<date>2013</date>
</dc>
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